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DRUG ADVERTISING CLAIMS:
PREEMPTION'S NEW FRONTIER
CatherineM. Sharkey*
Preemption's frontier in the realm of products liability is fastmoving indeed. Prior to 1992, product manufacturers' preemption
defenses to state common law tort actions met a brick wall. The
Supreme Court's opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group' ushered in a
new era for preemption in the realm of products liability by
interpreting federal preemptive "requirements" to include common
law tort actions. Between 1992 and 2009, the Court has addressed,
in fits and starts, preemption under congressional statutes that cover
the safety of automobiles, recreational boats, pesticides, medical
devices, and pharmaceutical drugs.
The current U.S. Supreme Court Term promises to be a true
watershed for products liability preemption. For the first time in the
decade and a half since the Court became active in this area, it is
poised to fashion a comprehensive framework for products liability
preemption. With Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,' a nearly unanimous
(eight to one) Court handed preemption advocates a decisive victory
in the medical devices realm. But any hopes for a spreading
landslide into the pharmaceutical realm were dashed by the Court's
per curiam summary affirmance by an equally divided (four to four)
Court in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent.4 Now, all eyes are on Wyeth
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The D'Agostino/Greenberg
Fund provided generous summer research support, and Sara Johnson provided helpful research
assistance.
1. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
2. The Supreme Court's products liability preemption jurisprudence is a small but
expanding area that traces its beginnings to the early 1990s with Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504, and
continues, most recently, through the 2008 decision of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999

(2008).
3. 128 S. Ct. 999.
4. 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008).
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v. Levine,5 another pharmaceutical case pending this Term. Riegel
and Kent will be on the minds of the Justices as they decide whether
state-law tort claims alleging failure-to-warn can survive a
preemption challenge where the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") has approved the label on a prescription drug.
At this juncture, it is worth contemplating the next frontier:
preemption of consumer fraud claims arising from prescription drug
advertising. To date, the Supreme Court's focus has been on
preemption of traditional tort claims impugning the safety of medical
devices and drugs either through design defect or failure-to-warn
claims. Even if the Court forecloses such tort claims, in whole or in
part, most likely the nascent, but ever-expanding, realm of related
consumer fraud claims will emerge unscathed.
Direct-to-consumer advertising ("DTCA") of prescription drugs
is a significant public policy issue for the twenty-first century. Part I
summarizes the relatively recent surge in expenditures on DTCA and
explores the possibility of a concomitant increase in consumer fraud
litigation stemming from drug advertisements.
Against this background, Part II focuses on the role of the FDA
in regulating drug advertisements. Highlighting the regulatory role
of the FDA is a prelude to consideration of the question whether
federal regulation should preempt, or oust, competing state consumer
fraud claims arising from drug advertisements. In prior work, I have
proposed an institutional approach to products liability preemption,
guided by what I termed an "agency reference model." Pursuant to
this model, courts should look to agencies to supply the data and
analysis necessary to determine when a uniform national regulatory
policy with respect to a certain product makes the most sense or,
instead, whether such regulation is better left to the states-in which
case a plaintiff's common law claim should be permitted to proceed.6
5.

128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (No. 06-1249) (argued Nov. 3, 2008).
6. See Catherine M. Sharkey, ProductsLiability Preemption: An InstitutionalApproach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008) [hereinafter, Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption]; see also
Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portendsfor State Law Products Liability Claims, 102 Nw.
U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 415 (2008) [hereinafter, Sharkey, What Riegel Portends], available at
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/24/;
Catherine
M.
Sharkey,
Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in PharmaceuticalCases in State Versus
Federal Court, 15 J. OF LAW & POL'Y 1013 (2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalismin Action];
Catherine M. Sharkey, The FraudCaveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 841 (2008);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: FederalAgencies and the Federalizationof Tort
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007) [hereinafter, Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble].
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The role played by an agency might be significant in two
respects. First, there is the degree of regulatory scrutiny employed
by the agency in its review and approval of products.7 Second, an
agency may assume a distinct interpretive role as administrator of the
congressional legislation and has a variety of means at its disposal to
express its position on preemption.8 These include official noticeand-comment rulemaking, less formal interpretive statements and
preambles to rules, and amicus briefs filed before courts.9 There is
good reason to be chary of agencies acting in their interpretive, as
distinct from regulatory, capacity."° Most of the arguments in favor
of agencies' comparative expertise speak to the rigor of the product
review and approval process."
The preemption inquiry in the new realm of consumer fraud and
drug advertising, taken up in Part III, hinges on an analysis of the
FDA's regulatory review of advertising claims. A comparison of
the FDA's regulatory scrutiny with respect to its approval of medical
devices and pharmaceutical drugs to its review of advertisements
reveals key weaknesses in product manufacturers' appeals to
preemption in the latter context. A critical distinction emerges: in
sharp contrast to medical devices and drug labels, which are subject
to scrutiny before a company may market a product, direct-toconsumer advertisements are reviewed, but not preapproved, by the
FDA. 2 Moreover, the FDA's review process for advertising
provides, at most, a "floor" (or minimal) rather than a "floor and a
ceiling" (or optimal) level of regulation.
I. DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING OF DRUGS

A. Spending Surge

Spending on prescription drug marketing is the fastest growing
component of the health care budget; total spending on
7. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 479.

8. See id.
9. See id.
10. For a discussion of the FDA's regulatory and interpretive roles, see Sharkey, What
Riegel Portends,supra note 6, at 420.
11. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation:
Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2008).
12. See PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: TRENDS IN FDA'S OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING, at 1 (GAO-08-758T) (May 8, 2008) [hereinafter GAO 2008 REPORT].
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pharmaceutical promotion increased from $11.4 billion in 1996 to
$29.9 billion in 2005."3 Annual spending (in real dollars) on directto-consumer advertising tripled between 1996 and 2005, when it
reached a total of $4.2 billion.'4 While reaching out directly to
consumers is by no means a new phenomenon, 5 there has been a
revolution in the means-specifically the launch of television
advertising of prescription drugs.
Prescription drug advertising is concentrated on remarkably few
drugs. Indeed, for the vast majority of prescription drugs, the
advertising budget is nil. 6 For a few select drugs, however (namely
those within the classes of antidepressants, antihistamines, antiinflammatory agents, anti-cholesterol, and erectile dysfunction
drugs), an enormous amount of money is spent on advertising. 7
13. Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising of Prescription
Drugs, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 673 (2007).
14. Id. at 675-76. DTCA nonetheless constitutes a relatively small portion of money spent
on drug promotion-roughly 15 percent of total promotional expenditures in 2005, as compared
to the nearly 80 percent spent on direct promotion to health care professionals. Id. at 673. Over
the last decade, spending on DTCA and promotional free samples to physicians has risen as a
proportion of total promotional spending, whereas spending on visits to doctors' offices and
advertising in professional journals has fallen as a proportional share. Id. at 675; see also
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECTTO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 14 (GAO-03-177) (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter GAO
2002 REPORT] ("[H]alf of the 10 drugs with the highest DTC spending were also among the 10
drugs with the greatest volume of samples distributed to physicians in 2000."); GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA'S
OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 16 (GAO-07-54) (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter
GAO 2006 REPORT] ("[S]tudies have found that advertising in medical journals and visits from
drug sales representatives may influence physician prescribing to a greater degree than DTC
advertising.").
15. Consider, for example, the claims made on behalf of "Lydia E. Pinkham's Vegetable
Compound" in an 1881 print advertisement: "To cure entirely the worst form of female
complaints, all ovarian troubles, inflammation and ulceration, falling and displacements. And the
consequent spinal weakness, and it is particularly adapted to the change of life." Julie Donohue,
A History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving Roles of Consumers and Consumer Protection, 84
THE MILBANK Q. 659, 664 (2006) (quoting advertisement in an 1881 Salt Lake City newspaper).
From a comparative perspective, the United States is at one permissive pole when it
comes to DTCA of prescription drugs. New Zealand is the only other country to allow direct-toconsumer advertising of pharmaceuticals (although bans in Canada and the European Union have
recently been challenged). Donohue et al., supra note 13, at 680.
16. See J.E. Calfee, An Assessment of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Drugs, 82 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 357, 359 (2007) ("Most drugs remain
unadvertised.").
17. For example, over half of industry spending in 2005 was used to promote twenty drugs.
Donohue et al., supra note 13, at 676. Higher quality drugs (as measured by FDA's priority
rating) are more likely to be advertised, particularly when the drug was first or second in its
therapeutic class; and spending on advertising correlates with potential market size, rather than
current treatment population size. See Ernst Berndt, The United States' Experience with Direct-
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Typically, the campaigns for these heavily advertised drugs are

targeted to run within one year of FDA approval of the drug. 8
The proliferation of DTCA of prescription drugs has spawned a
vibrant public policy debate. Staunch defenders of DTCA link the

practice to the rise of consumer empowerment or patients' rights in
health care, emphasizing that DTCA leads to better informed

consumers, increased utilization of drugs, and increased quality of
care.' 9 Less obvious benefits touted by DTCA supporters are that

to-Consumer Advertising of PrescriptionDrugs: What Have We Learned?, in PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION 174, 181-84 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007).
18. Donohue et al., supra note 13, at 676 ("Notably, nearly all (17 of 20) advertising
campaigns for the most heavily advertised drugs began within a year after FDA approval of the
drug."). In part, this is because relatively new drugs will have the longest prospective time under
patent protection. See GAO 2002 REPORT, supra note 14, at 12-13.
19. See, e.g., Alan F. Holmer, Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising-Strengthening Our Health
Care System, 346 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 526, 527 (2002) (advocating, as a PhRMA representative,
that DTCA strengthens the doctor-patient relationship by encouraging patients to talk with their
doctors about previously undiagnosed conditions) (citing a 1991 survey by Prevention magazine,
which found that DTCA prompted twenty-four million Americans over a two-year period to
initiate a conversation about previously unaddressed symptoms with their respective doctors);
Andrew R. Robinson et al., Direct-to-Consumer PharmaceuticalAdvertising: Physician and
Public Opinion and PotentialEffects on the Physician-PatientRelationship, 164 ARCH. INTERN.
MED. 427, 428 (2004) (reporting results of a 2001 Kaiser Family Foundation survey that "found
that 30 percent of adults have inquired about an advertised drug with their physician, and 44
percent of those actually reported receiving the requested prescription"). But see INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE
PUBLIC 159 (2007) (characterizing the impact of DTCA "as a communication or education tool"
as "mixed," while acknowledging that "[t]here is evidence that advertisements have raised
awareness about certain health conditions and led people to visit their health care provider and in
some cases, receive needed diagnosis and treatment"); Sanjo Adeoye & Kevin J. Bozic, Direct to
Consumer Advertising in Healthcare: History, Benefits, and Concerns, 457 CLINICAL
ORTHOPEDICS & RELATED RES. 96, 98 (2007) ("DTCA cannot simultaneously fulfill goals of
educating consumers and increasing pharmaceutical sales."); Sidney M. Wolfe, Direct-toConsumer Advertising-Education or Emotion Promotion?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524, 526
(2002) ("The education of patients-or physicians-is too important to be left to the
pharmaceutical industry, with its pseudoeducational campaigns designed, first and foremost, to
promote drugs.").
Empirical studies have established a link between DTCA and drug utilization. See, e.g.,
GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 14 ("Studies we reviewed suggest that [DTCA] . . .
increases prescription drug spending and utilization."). But see GAO 2002 REPORT, supra note
14, at 6 (suggesting, based upon comparative analysis of increased drug utilization in the United
States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, that confounding factors-such as an aging
population, new medications for previously untreatable conditions, and increased insurance
coverage-may explain increased drug utilization). Making the link from increased drug
utilization to increased (or decreased) quality of health care outcomes has proved much more
difficult.
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advertisements encourage compliance with treatment regimes 2 and
spur new product development.2'
Equally (or perhaps more) vociferous opponents, however,
emphasize a host of downside risks and effects. First, physicians
expend unnecessary time and energy responding to patients' requests
for various prescription drugs that have piqued their interest on
television. 2
Second, given the pressure of patient demand,
physicians prescribe expensive and unnecessary medications, which
23
can lead to heightened safety risks and health care costs.

20. See, e.g., Calfee, supra note 16, at 359 (reporting studies linking DTCA with modest
improvements in compliance for particular classes of drugs, such as statins and anti-depressants);
Holmer, supra note 19, at 527 (noting that 33 percent of individuals surveyed by Prevention
magazine in 1999 "reported that such advertising had reminded them to fulfill a prescription"); id.
(reporting results of a 2001 industry (Pfizer) study finding that patients who were prompted by an
advertisement to fill their prescription were substantially more likely to continue treatment after
six months than those who filled prescriptions absent such prompting).
21. See Calfee, supra note 16, at 357 (citing John E. Calfee, The Role of Marketing in
PharmaceuticalResearch and Development, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS (Supp. 3) 77, 85 (2002)
("The prescription drug market offers exceptional opportunities for direct-to-consumer
advertising to... motivate new-product development.")).
22. See, e.g., Adeoye & Bozic, supra note 19, at 98; Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians
Report on PatientEncounters Involving Direct-To-ConsumerAdvertising, HEALTH AFFAIRS 219,
231
(2004), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.219vl.pdf
(reporting that physicians in focus groups "complained that DTCA caused them to waste time
explaining to patients why they did not need a particular brand-name drug"); id. at 220 ("The
American Medical Association (AMA) perceives that DTCA places a time burden on physicians
but accepts the practice as long as there are efforts to ensure clear and balanced information.")
(citing Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, Direct-toConsumer Advertising of PrescriptionDrugs, 55 FOOD AND DRUG J. 119-124 (2000)); see also
Robinson et al., supra note 19, at 427 (noting that physicians complain that "advertisements
rarely provide enough information on cost (98.7%), alternative treatment options (94.9%), or
adverse effects (54.8%)").
23. See, e.g., GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 ("Studies suggest that physicians are
generally responsive to consumers' requests, and that decisions to prescribe a drug are influenced
by a variety of factors in addition to a patient's medical condition."); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 19, at 158 ("DTC advertising may distort use patterns within classes of drugs, often
driving use of more costly but not more effective therapies at the expense of older, cheaper
options (e.g., generics)."); Robinson et al., supra note 19, at 428 (reporting survey results
documenting that 71 percent of family physicians have prescribed a drug that they otherwise
would not have prescribed, absent the patient's request for the drug); Weissman et al., supra note
22, at 229 (reporting results of a study in which physicians prescribed a drug requested by
patients 39 percent of the time, and in 20 percent of those cases, physicians "thought that the
DTCA drug would have no effect on their patient's overall health"); Wolfe, supra note 19, at 526
(arguing that physicians are often "duped gatekeepers" who too easily cede to patients'
exhortations to write a prescription). But see Calfee, supra note 16, at 358 ("[T]here is
considerable evidence that whether or not DTCA is involved, physicians tend to cater to patient
preferences when they ask for prescriptions so long as the risks are minimal."); id. at 359 ("Some
of the most heavily advertised drugs are in therapeutic classes (such as statins and
antidepressants) that are underprescribed and that sometimes reduce total health-care costs.").
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In recent years, there have been calls for a ban-either partial or
total-on DTCA.2 ' The Institute of Medicine called for the FDA to
place limits on DTCA, especially for new drugs.25 In 2006, Senators
Edward Kennedy and Michael Enzi sponsored a bill that included a
two-year moratorium on DTCA of new drugs.2 6
B. Litigation Surge?

One thing is sure: with the rise of DTCA, we can expect a
burgeoning number of consumer fraud claims.
1. End Run Around Preempted Failure-to-Warn Claims?
The historical model for an end run around preemption of
failure-to-warn claims is provided by the watershed case Cipollone v.
Liggett Group,27 which (as noted above) was the progenitor of the
Court's products liability preemption jurisprudence. 8 Cipollone
interpreted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 2 9 as
forging a distinction between health and safety specific failure-towarn claims-which were expressly preempted under the statuteand general fraudulent misrepresentation claims-which were not
preempted." A plurality of the Court reasoned that unlike failure-towarn claims, which were predicated upon "a duty 'based on smoking
24. Such calls were heightened in the wake of the Vioxx debacle, especially after the 2004
withdrawal of Vioxx from the market. Public opinion polls demonstrate the unpopularity of
DTCA. For example, in a 2005 Wall Street Journal survey (conducted by Harris Interactive), 51
percent of respondents agreed that it would be beneficial to ban DTCA "for some period of time
after [approval] so doctors have time to become familiar with the drug." INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 162 (citing 2005 Harris Interactive Survey, available at
http://www.harrisi.org/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=947).
25. Id. at 151-76.
26. See Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act, S. 3807, 189th Cong. § 2 (2006). For
Senators Kennedy's and Enzi's statements on the bill, see Press Release, Chairman Mike Enzi, S.
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, available at http://help.senate.gov/
Maj-press/2006_l _16.pdf. The bill also provided authorization for the FDA to require preapproval of advertisements. S.3807, 189th Cong. § 2 (2006).
27. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
28. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
29. Pub. L. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1965)).
The Act espouses two main goals: "(1) adequately informing the public that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health, and (2) protecting the national economy from the burden imposed by
diverse, non-uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations." Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 514.
30. A plurality of the Court held that "fraudulent-misrepresentation claims that do arise with
respect to advertising and promotions (most notably claims based on allegedly false statements of
material fact made in advertisements) are not preempted." Id. at 528.
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and health' and thus preempted, fraudulent misrepresentation claims
were based upon "a more general obligation-the duty not to
Moreover, the plurality continued, "[u]nlike state-law
deceive. '"'
obligations concerning the warning necessary to render a product
'reasonably safe,' state-law proscriptions on intentional fraud rely
'
only on a single, uniform standard: falsity. "32
In the wake of Cipollone, consumer fraud claims based upon the
marketing of "light" and "lower tar and nicotine" cigarettes
proliferated."
This Term, in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, the
Supreme Court jumped into the fray to resolve a circuit split on
whether such consumer fraud and misrepresentation claims are
preempted.34
The key question was whether implied
misrepresentation claims should be considered similar in kind to
failure-to-warn claims or closer to fraud by intentional
misrepresentation. The Fifth Circuit was partial to the view that the
claims were failure-to-warn claims in disguise, and thus expressly
preempted. The First Circuit, by contrast, rested its finding of no
express preemption on the distinction between a "duty based on
smoking and health" (which would be preempted) and a "duty not to
deceive" (which would escape preemption).35 The First Circuit,
moreover, rejected the implied preemption argument (not addressed
in Cipollone) based upon the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
actions in regulating cigarette labeling.36 The Supreme Court sided
31. Id. at 528-29.
32. Id. at 529.
33. See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING
TOBACCO 176, 184-85 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 2001) (contrasting the first two waves of tobacco
litigation based on plaintiffs' claims of failure to warn with a "third wave" after Cipollone
focused on industry deceit and misrepresentation, including class actions and suits by state
governments, insurers, and union health care funds).
34. No. 07-562, 129 S.Ct. 538 (Dec. 15, 2008).
35. Compare Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007), with Brown v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007).
36. 501 F.3d at 36. The FTC's regulation of light cigarettes over the past half century has
taken some twists and turns. In 1959, the major cigarette companies agreed to remove all claims
regarding tar and nicotine levels from cigarette labels and packaging. Id. at 30-32. In 1966,
however, the FTC advised the companies that they could include a valid factual statement
regarding lower tar and nicotine, so long as any statement was supported by adequate records of
tastes. Id. In 1967, the FTC adopted the "Cambridge Filter Method" to test cigarettes' factual
statements as to tar levels-the very method utilized by the cigarette companies, notwithstanding
its inability to measure the amount of nicotine inhaled by a human smoker. Id. In 1970, the FTC
proposed a rule to require all advertised cigarettes to include the levels of tar and nicotine as
established by the FTC; the proposed rule was suspended when the manufacturers agreed to a
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with the First Circuit, holding that plaintiffs state law fraud claim
was neither expressly nor impliedly preempted.37 Altria, decided by

a five-to-four majority of the Court, thus shores up the Cipollone
plurality ruling and breathes new life into efforts to structure state
law fraud claims around federal preemption.
The post-Cipollone story is instructive, as it portends an

analogous trajectory for drug advertising claims in the wake of
potentially viable preemption defenses to failure-to-warn claims.
Moreover, the state law claims for economic harms at issue in the
cigarette cases are nearly identical to those asserted in the drug

advertising context.
2. The Nature of Consumer Fraud Claims
Consumer fraud claims raise theories of economic harm.
Consumer fraud statutes have their origin in common law fraud and
the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act").38

Common law

fraud claims typically require an intentional misrepresentation of
material facts, reliance by the recipient, causation, and damages.39

Consumer protection statutes often relax one or more of the common
law fraud elements, for example, by liberalizing standing
requirements, or by relieving plaintiffs of the burden of
demonstrating causation or injury."0 Most consumer fraud statutes
voluntary program of like effect. Id. The FTC has not re-instituted any rulemaking proceedings;
moreover, the tests were curtailed in 1987, though continued by the cigarette companies. Id.
The First Circuit based its rejection of implied preemption on the fact that the FTC did
not use the formal rulemaking procedures; there is no established policy on the use of terms such
as "low tar" and "light"; and implied preemption should be based upon the rationales for agency
action, not agency action itself. Id. at 58-59.
37. Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 545-46, 549-51. In rejecting implied preemption, the
Court was swayed by the fact that the Government itself disavowed any longstanding policy of
the FTC authorizing the use of "light" and "low tar" descriptors. Id. at 549. Altria then fits the
empirical pattern of what I have described as Supreme Court deference to agency positions in
preemption cases. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 471 ("[F]rom
Cipollone in 1992 to Riegel in 2008, the Supreme Court's position in every products liability
preemption case (save one-Bates) aligned with the relevant underlying federal agency's take on
preemption.").
38. See Alan S. Brown & Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of ConsumerFraudStatutes Across
the Fifty States, 55 FED'N DEF. & CORP. COUNSEL Q. 263, 266-70 (2005). Brown and Hepler
distinguish three categories of state consumer fraud statutes: 1) those based on the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act or Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act; 2) those based on
"consumer fraud" acts; and 3) those based on the FTC Act.
39. See EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1195-96 ( 91hed. 2008).
40. Brown & Hepler, supra note 38, at 264-65. Brown and Helper characterize the major
differences among state consumer fraud statutes as follows:
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also provide some version of a safe harbor for claims stemming from
alleged violations of laws administered by the FTC 41 or another
regulatory body.
The misleading or false claims against the drug manufacturer
could be directed either at the drug's risk profile (safety claims) or
else the drug's performance (efficacy claims). 43 Drug advertising
claims raise two related theories of damage: (1) the "price inflation"
theory, which posits that consumers overpaid for a particular drug
whose price was inflated as a result of misleading or false claims;
and (2) the "product substitution" theory, which likewise claims that
consumers overpaid for a particular drug, but in this instance
because, absent the misleading or false claim, they would have
purchased another (lower priced) drug that was equally (or more)
efficacious. Each theory is based on the premise that the consumer
paid more for the drug than was warranted on account of the drug
manufacturer's false or misleading claims.44
Price inflation theories have thus far gained little traction in
court.45 Several commentators, moreover, argue against recovery in
(a) whether the statutes permit a private cause of action; (b) whether causation or injury
is a required element; (c) whether reliance is a required element; (d) whether and to
what extent intent constitutes a required element; and (e) the remedies available and
the standards for making such awards, including attorney's fees.
Id. at 270.
41. See, e.g., Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233-34 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
42. See, e.g., Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome PLC, 246 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001).
43. See, e.g., Prohias,490 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (raising allegations that drug manufacturer
marketed Lipitor for conditions not yet approved by the FDA); Scott v. GlaxoSmithKline
Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 2006 WL 952032 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (raising allegations that drug
manufacturer overstated speed and efficacy of drug); New Jersey Citizen Action v. ScheringPlough Corp., 842 A.2d 174, 177 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (raising allegations that
benefits of drug were overstated with promise of a "normal nearly symptom-free life").
44. Courts and commentators frequently invoke the analogy to the price inflation theory in
the securities fraud context. The analogy is imperfect, however, to the extent that drug prices are
fixed by drug companies based upon government-granted monopoly rights, whereas stock prices
are set by the market and generally sensitive to changes in information. See, e.g., Prohias v.
Pfizer, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ("[Plaintiffs] depend on the faulty
premise that the price of Lipitor fluctuates based on the public's knowledge of Lipitor's benefits,
even though drug prices (unlike stock prices which are necessarily set by the price at which
buyers are willing to buy, or sellers [are] willing to sell) are fixed by the product's
manufacturer.").
45. See, e.g., id. at 1336-37 ("[S]uch damages are too speculative to constitute an injury-infact under Article Ill." . . . [T]o show any damages under the 'price inflation' theory (assuming
the price did incorporate information about Lipitor's benefits), would require evidence of the
hypothetical price at which Lipitor would sell if not for the allegedly misleading
advertisements."); see also New Jersey Citizen Action, 842 A.2d 174.
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pure economic loss cases, so as to preserve damages "to compensate
46
real victims, that is, consumers who have actually been harmed.
Product substitution theories, by contrast, offer a glimmer of
hope. Comparative safety and efficacy claims lend themselves to the
product substitution theory of damages.4 7 Courts have found this

theory more promising, in part because "[t]o show injury, the parties
need not speculate as to the price of the good at issue in a different
world, but rather can simply look to the price of the substitute
good."4
II. FDA's REGULATORY REVIEW OF ADVERTISING
The FDA has the authority to regulate the realm of prescription
drugs. So, what precisely, is the federal policy (if any) governing
prescription drug advertising?
A. FDA Authority: Advertising Regulations and Guidelines
The FDA's authority to regulate advertising is related to its

authority to approve prescription drugs for safety and efficacy. In
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA"), Congress
charged the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services
("HHS") with regulating drugs marketed in the United States,
including the approval, labeling, and promotion of those drugs.49
The Secretary has delegated that authority to the FDA." Congress
granted regulatory jurisdiction of prescription drug advertising to the
FDA in 1962, displacing the FTC's prior jurisdiction."
46. See, e.g., Moin A. Yahya, Can I Sue Without Being Injured?: Why the Benefit of the
Bargain Theory for ProductLiability Is Bad Law and Bad Economics, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

83, 113-14 (2002) ("It can be argued, against the 'benefit of the bargain' plaintiff, that the
difference between the value represented and the value received contains an insurance premium
reserved for actual injuries and that this premium would be unjustly usurped by the no-injury
plaintiff if his or her suit was successful.").
47. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(denying drug manufacturer's motion for summary judgment in a case where plaintiffs alleged
that Eli Lilly marketed Zyprexa as safer and more efficacious than other available drugs, finding
that the economic analysis required to determine damages might be sophisticated, but such
challenges did not preclude recovery).
48. Prohias,485 F. Supp.2d at 1338 n.3.
49. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-321 (2006).
50. 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1)(1999).
51. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Amendments of 1962, § 502, 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006).
Subsection (n) reads:
[N]o advertisement of a prescription drug, published after the effective date of
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Under the FDCA's regulatory regime, drugs are "misbranded" if
pharmaceutical companies do not comply with the Act's advertising
requirements. 2 Section 502(n) of the FDCA sets forth three required
components for all prescription drug advertisements: (1) the
established (organic) drug name; 53 (2) the formula showing each
ingredient; 54 and (3) a "brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness. ' ' 5' A 1969 FDA regulation
required advertisements to present a "fair balance" between
information regarding side effects and information regarding the
effectiveness of the drug. 6 The FDCA's advertising requirements
apply to promotional materials that identify prescription drugs by
name published in journals, magazines, newspapers, other
periodicals, and the Internet or broadcast via radio, television, or
telephone.57
In the 1980s, the FDA examined the desirability of DTCA 8
The FDA proposed a voluntary moratorium in 1983 but in 1985
concluded that the regulations "provide[d] 'sufficient safeguards to
protect consumers. ' 59 A 1985 directive required advertisements to
regulations issued under [the] paragraph applicable to advertisements of prescription
drugs, shall with respect to the matters specified in this paragraph or covered by such
regulations, be subject to the provisions of sections [12 through 17 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act].
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-57 (2006)). The 1962 Amendments (Kefauver-Harris) expanded the
FDA's authority over prescription drugs to ensure that drugs are not only "safe" but also
"effective" prior to marketing. The FTC has had jurisdiction over drug advertisements since
1938, under the Wheeler Lea Act. The FTC retains jurisdiction over advertisements promoting
over-the-counter drugs, as well as "help seeking" advertisements that publicize the symptoms of a
disease or condition but do not identify drugs by name. See GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at
2 n.4.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (n) (2006). Specific regulations spell out what constitutes a false or
misleading advertisement. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6) (2007). Misbranded drugs are subject to
seizure in enforcement proceedings. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 334, 337. There is no private right of
action under the FDCA. Id. § 337(a).
53. Id. § 352(n)(1).
54. Id. § 352(n)(2).
55. Id. § 352(n)(3). Subsequent FDA regulations further explicate the "brief summary"
requirement, which differs across advertising media. See 21 C.F.R. § 202. 1(e)(1)(2007).
56. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(ii). In addition, drug manufacturers are prohibited from making
unsupported comparison claims and presenting information that has been invalidated by
subsequent studies. Id.
57. Id. § 202.1(1)(1).
58. See e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 19, at 160.
59. How
DTC
Evolved,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/Presentations/
SocietyforWomensHealth/societyforwomensheath205novide-filesframe.htm#side28.htm.
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meet the same legal requirements as those directed to physicians.6"
The effect of these regulations was to preclude television advertising,
as it was all but impossible to present a "fair balance" of side effects
information within a sound bite television commercial.61
The unleashing of television advertisements was prompted in
1997 by the issuance of draft guidelines for broadcast activity.62
Most significantly, the guidelines stated that the requirement to
provide summary information on "side effects, contraindications, and
effectiveness" could be met by directing consumers to one of four
sources for additional information: a doctor, a toll-free number, a
print advertisement, or a website.63
B. FDA Activity: Review and Enforcement

Drug manufacturers
must submit prescription
drug
advertisements to the FDA concurrently with first publication or
broadcast to the public. 64 FDA's Division of Drug Marketing,
Advertising,
and
Communications
("DDMAC")
reviews
advertisements for compliance with the FDCA and for possible
enforcement action.65 In 2002, DDMAC created a Direct to
Consumer Review Group, which handles oversight of all DTCA.6 6
FDA review is designed to make sure that information
communicated to consumers is neither false nor misleading, presents
a fair balance of the risks and benefits, reveals material facts, and
discloses major side effects.67

Pre-publication review of advertisements is conducted on a
limited basis. 68 Drug manufacturers may submit advertisements to
60. 56 Fed. Reg. 36,677 (Sept. 9, 1985).
61. The advertisements that did air were "help seeking" advertisements in which the
companies described a condition and prompted viewers to visit their doctors and "reminder"
advertisements, in which companies gave the name of the drug but did not explain its indication.
62. The final guidelines were issued in 1999. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
GUIDANCE

FOR INDUSTRY:

CONSUMER-DIRECTED

BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS

(1999),

available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.pdf.
63. Id.
64. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3) (2007).
65. DDMAC is housed within FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. As of
2006, DDMAC had forty-one full time employees responsible for reviewing advertising directed
both to consumers and to health care professionals. See GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 10.
66. See GAO 2008 REPORT, supra note 12, at 5.
67. See GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.
68. 21 C.F.R. creates a safe harbor in the limited circumstances when FDA requires drug
manufacturers to submit advertisements prior to dissemination. 21 C.F.R. § 202.10)(4).
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the DDMAC on a voluntary basis prior to release.69 The FDA is
committed to review proposed prescription drug advertisements
when requested to do so by pharmaceutical companies.7° The
DDMAC may provide advisory comments for the drug
manufacturer's consideration prior to dissemination of the
advertisement. 7 The FDCA, however, prohibits the FDA from
requiring pre-approval of advertisements, except in "extraordinary
circumstances.

72

The FDA issues regulatory letters to drug manufacturers, giving
notice of violations. 73 Regulatory letters come in two varieties: (1)
"warning letters," which carry the potential for subsequent
enforcement action should the drug manufacturer not address the
violation; and (2) "untitled letters," which do not have the
accompanying enforcement sting.74 The typical infractions noted in
the letters include minimizing risks, exaggerating effectiveness, or
both. 75 The DDMAC can request that a drug manufacturer cease
using an offending advertisement; it can also request that the
manufacturer issue a remedial advertisement to correct any
misstatement. 7 6 Should a drug manufacturer fail to withdraw or
correct an offending advertisement, the Department of Justice's

Office of Consumer Litigation may, at the behest of the FDA, seize
69. See id. ("Any advertisement may be submitted to the [FDA] prior to publication for
comment."). Industry group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
encourages member companies to submit television advertisements to the FDA prior to broadcast
in order "to give the FDA the opportunity to comment, consistent with its priorities and
resources." PHMRA, PHRMA GUIDING PRINCIPLES: DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISEMENTS
http://
at
available
8
(2005),
MEDICINES
PRESCRIPTION
ABOUT
www.phrma.org/files/DTCGuidingprinciples.pdf.
70. 21 C.F.R. § 202.10)(4).
71. See GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 10.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(A) (2006) ("[Elxcept in extraordinary circumstances, no regulation
issued under this paragraph shall require prior approval by the Secretary of the content of any
advertisement .. "). Qualifying "extraordinary circumstances" include potentially fatal drugs
whose risks have not been widely disseminated in the medical literature, see 21 C.F.R. § 202. (1),
life-saving drugs approved under the FDA's accelerated approval process, see id. § 314.550; and
drugs approved based on animal studies alone (where human efficacy studies are not feasible),
see id. § 314.640.
73. See GAO 2008 REPORT, supra note 12, at 5.
74. Id.; see also id. at 5-6 ("Both types of letters cite the type of violation identified in the
company's advertising material, request that the company submit a written response to FDA
within 14 days, and request that the company take specific actions.").
75. The FDA posts letters on www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/lawsregs.htm.
76. See GAO 2008 REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
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the "misbranded" drugs on account of their false or misleading
advertising or issue an injunction against the manufacturer.77 While
there is no private right of action for individuals to enforce the
FDCA,78 private citizens (including consumers, competitors, etc.)
may submit complaints or requests for investigations to the
DDMAC.79
The FDA's capacity to police advertising regulations has
weakened in recent years. First, the number of letters sent by the
FDA to drug manufacturers regarding violations of drug
advertisements decreased from 142 in 1997 to 21 in 2006.80 Part of
this precipitous decline has been attributed to the Secretary of HHS's
decision in 2002 to require the FDA's Office of Chief Counsel to
oversee all regulatory letters." Second, the number of staff members
dedicated to reviewing advertisements has not kept pace with the
rising tide of spending on drug advertising.82
The FDA's seemingly lax regulation of prescription drug
advertisements has come under sharp criticism. The Government
Accountability Office has faulted the FDA for inadequate review of
advertisements as well as for the low level and slow speed of its
enforcement actions.83 Calls for reform have reached the national
77. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-34 (2006).
78. Id. § 337(a) ("[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of
this [Act] shall be by and in the name of the United States.").
79. See GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 10-12.
80. Donohue et al., supra note 13, at 676.
81. A GAO Report found that this oversight contributed to a decline in the number of letters
written-from 68 in 2001 to 28 in 2002. See GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 12; see also
GAO 2008 REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 ("After the policy change, FDA issued about half as
many regulatory letters that cited violative DTC advertisements per year-between 8 and I I
letters annually from 2002 through 2005, compared with 15 to 25 letters annually from 1997
through 2001. FDA issued 4 such letters in 2006 and 2 in 2007.").
82. In 2002, the DDMAC created the "DTC Review Group" to oversee advertising materials
directed to consumers. See supra text accompanying note 66. But staffing has not kept pace with
the surge in DTCA. For example, during the time period from 2002-2004, spending on
advertisements increased by 45 percent, whereas the number of FDA staff members dedicated to
reviewing advertisements increased only from 3 to 4. See Julie Schmit, Drug Ads to Get More
FDA
Scrutiny,
USA
TODAY,
Feb.
25,
2008
at
1B,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/2008-02-24-drug-ads-N.htm.
As of May 2008, the DTC Review Group consisted of two group leaders, seven
reviewers and two social scientists dedicated to policing DTCA. See 2008 GAO REPORT, supra
note 12, at 5. In 2007, the FDA received 12,616 advertisements to review. See Schmit, supra, at
lB.
83. Only a "small portion" of drug advertisements are reviewed. GAO 2008 REPORT, supra
note 12, at 6. Moreover, the GAO noted that the FDA often did not weigh in on the misleading
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agenda. In his proposed 2009 budget, President Bush called for $14
million from fees to fund twenty-seven FDA positions devoted to the
consumer-advertisement review program. 4
III. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS

Before analyzing the case for preemption of consumer fraud
claims based upon false or misleading drug advertisements, it is
worth situating this issue within the broader context of federal
preemption of state tort claims involving FDA-approved medical
devices and pharmaceutical drugs. At the outset, it is worth
highlighting that there is a salient difference between preemption in
the realms of medical devices and pharmaceuticals. The Medical
Devices Amendment to the FDCA contains an express preemption
clause,85 whereas the provisions governing pharmaceuticals do not.
In fact, the drug provisions include a qualified "savings" clause. 6
nature of the advertisement until the advertisement campaign had already run its course. See
GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 27 (finding that more than half of the advertising materials
cited in regulatory letters were no longer in circulation by the time DDMAC's letters were
issued). In other instances, even after receiving the FDA's regulatory letter, drug manufacturers
continued to disseminate violative advertisements. See GAO 2008 REPORT, supra note 12, at 14
("From 1997 through 2005, FDA issued regulatory letters for violative DTC materials used to
promote 89 different drugs. Of these 89 drugs, 25 had DTC materials that FDA cited in more
than one regulatory letter, and one drug had DTC materials cited in eight regulatory letters.").
84. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Budget In Brief: Fiscal Year 2009, 16 (2008),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm.
Funding the program with user fees, as opposed to direct congressional appropriations, is
a controversial feature. The user fee program was established by the FDA Amendments Act in
September 2007, but was not implemented within the statute's required timeline. See FDA
Budget Summary, FY 2009 Congressional Justifications, Other Legislative Items (Jan. 30, 2008),
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofin/budget/2009/Execsum/9 Other LegItems.pdf.
User fees were vociferously opposed by Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn), who
chairs a subcommittee overseeing FDA funds: "I believe Congress should provide a direct
appropriation in order to minimize industry influence in the FDA." Schmit, supra note 82, at lB
(quoting Representative DeLauro); see also Press Release, Restoring the Gold Standard at the

FDA (expressing desire for "a strong funding proposal for the FDA"), available at
http://www.house.gov/delauro/press/2008/January/GoldFDA_1_29_08.html.
Congress ultimately refused to authorize the base funding required to launch the program
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of
Direct-to-Consumer Television Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products;
Program Will Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 16, 2008) (withdrawing notice set
forth in 72 Fed. Reg. 70334 establishing user fee rates for program for FY 2008).
85. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(l) (2006).
86. Harris-Kefauver Act § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962) ("Nothing in the amendments made
by this Act to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any
provision of State law ... unless there is a direct andpositive conflict between such amendments

and such provision of State law." (emphasis added)). Despite the existence of the savings clause,
federal law may still preempt state law claims when the federal requirements "conflict" with state
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Arguments in favor of preemption in the pharmaceutical
context, then, must be based on implied as opposed to express
preemption. In deciding implied preemption, courts look beyond
statutory provisions specifically addressing preemption to consider
the entire statutory scheme, including its regulatory purposes. 7
Implied preemption comes in two varieties. "Field preemption"
occurs where the federal government has regulated an area so
comprehensively that the federal interest occupies, and thus
dominates, an entire subject matter, leaving no room for competing
state regulation. "Conflict preemption" occurs where the federal
interest conflicts with underlying state law, either in the narrow sense
that an actor would find it impossible to comply with both
commands, or, in the broader sense, that compliance with the state
law command would pose an obstacle to, or frustrate, federal
regulatory purposes and objectives.88
A. Field Preemption
I have argued elsewhere that implied field preemption
arguments should be taken off the table in the context of failure-towarn claims stemming from drug labeling.89 As an initial matter, the
field preemption argument may be a nonstarter in light of the
statutory provisions-namely, the inclusion of a qualified savings
clause, which would seem to require narrower conflict preemption.9"
Moreover, in enacting the drug provisions, Congress's full attention
was devoted to specifying regulatory requirements; in the 1962
amendments, Congress neither provided a federal private right of
action nor addressed remedies for consumers injured by dangerous
drugs with inadequate warnings." Although the existence of such a
complete "remedial void" should not lead inevitably to an antipreemption position, it should nonetheless take arguments for
implied field preemption off the table. And in the drug labeling
requirements. In other words, implied conflict preemption-arguably including both the
narrower "impossibility" variety as well as the broader "obstacle" or "frustration of purposes"
variety-retains its vitality in the realm of pharmaceuticals. See infra text accompanying notes
88, 110-11.
87. See Sharkey, ProductsLiability Preemption, supra note 6, at 455.
88. Seeid. at456n.21.
89. See id. at 503-504.
90. See supra note 86.
91. See Sharkey, ProductsLiability Preemption, supra note 6, at 503.
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context, field preemption arguments are few and far between.92
Therefore, it is all the more surprising to see these arguments
surface-let alone succeed-in the drug advertising context.
For example, the United States, on behalf of the FDA,
intervened at the California federal district court's request in In re
Paxil Litigation,93 a case involving consumer fraud claims stemming
from the alleged misleading advertisements of Paxil, one of a class of
pharmaceuticals known as SSRIs (selective serotonin re-uptake
inhibitors). In a somewhat remarkable amicus brief, the government
argued that the FDA's administration of the comprehensive statutory
and regulatory scheme governing prescription drug advertising in
essence preempted the field, displacing state-law consumer fraud
claims.94 In the alternative, the government urged that "given the
intent of Congress to centralize prescription drug advertisement
regulation in the FDA, [the] Court should defer to the agency's
primary jurisdiction."95 In making its claims, the government painted
a picture of a highly concentrated and highly regulated drug
advertising review process:
Congress clearly intended the FDA to regulate prescription
drug marketing. The law gives FDA the authority to review
92. Several academic commentators, nonetheless, continue to clamor for field preemption,
arguing its desirability "[b]y virtue of the specificity and comprehensiveness of the [FDCA's]
regulation of prescription drugs." David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product
Liabilityfor PrescriptionDrugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to
Uniform PharmaceuticalSafety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 395, 414-16 (1996); see also
Richard A. Epstein, The Casefor Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 NW. U. L.
at
available
(2008),
54
COLLOQUY
REV.
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/29.
93. No. CV 01-07937, 2002 WL 31375497, at *1 (CD. Cal. 2002).
94. Brief of the United States of America at 10, In re Paxil Litig., No. CV 01-07937 MRP,
218 F.R.D. 242, 2001 WL 34883537 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The facts in In re Paxil supported a much
narrower implied conflict argument. At the time the FDA approved the new drug application for
Paxil, the agency found no clinical evidence that it was habit-forming. Id. at 4. The FDA
reviewed Paxil advertisements on five separate occasions between 2001 and 2002; four versions
of these advertisements contained the statement: Paxil is "non-habit forming." The FDA found
none of these advertisements to be misleading. Id. The government's brief also raised implied
conflict preemption: "In the present case, FDA reviewed the particular advertisement at issue and
made suggestions as to the precise issue that is the subject of plaintiff's request for relief. Based
on its scientific and medical expertise with this drug and other similar drugs, FDA decided that
the advertisements are acceptable." Id. at 6. But clearly the government wanted to use the
favorable fact scenario to press for a wider field preemption position.
95. Id. at 2; see id. at 7 ("If Plaintiffs are found to state a valid claim despite preemption
analysis, the Court should exercise its discretion under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and
allow FDA to consider further, in light of Plaintiffs' arguments, whether the Paxil advertisement
is misleading.").
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all published prescription drug advertisements and to bring
enforcement actions against those who would attempt to
mislead the public in any way. The FDCA and its
implementing regulations set specific criteria by which the
FDA is to judge such advertisements. . . . [T]he FDCA
subjects the drug industry to a comprehensive national
regulatoryscheme in which FDA stands at the center.96
According to the government, the FDA is "responsible for
answering scientific and policy questions in the national arena of
prescription drug advertisements."97 And, echoing its argument with
respect to the need for uniformity in drug labeling, the government
reasoned that
[w]ere the courts of various jurisdictions to mandate what
may and may not appear in prescription drug
advertisements pursuant to state law, the public
undoubtedly would receive inconsistent information from
region to region; furthermore, court-imposed advertising
content or restrictions would lack the benefit of FDA's
scientific expertise and consideration of relevant policy
issues."
The federal district court was fairly harsh in rejecting the FDA's
(and the manufacturer's) preemption claim, saying the "position
contravenes common sense."99
The government's entree (at the court's behest) into the drug
advertising preemption row was also its finale. Given the steady
stream of government intervention in drug labeling cases beginning
in 2000 (and continuing to the present),' ° one might consider
dismissing the government's view as aberrant or idiosyncratic. In
fact, its amicus brief in In re Paxil had gone largely unnoticed (again,
unlike its interventions in the drug labeling cases)-that is, until the

96. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 10.
98. Id. at 5.
99. In re Paxil Litig., No. CV 01-07937, 2002 WL 31375497, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("FDA
and [the drug manufacturer] invite the Court to find that in enacting the FDCA for the purposes of
protecting public health, Congress not only declined to provide for a private cause of action, but
also eliminated the availability of common law state claims.").
100. See Sharkey, Federalism in Action, supra note 6, at 1037-38 (describing numerous
instances in which the government filed amicus briefs in drug cases since 2000).
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heartily endorsed it in a recent
decision.
In Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca,
Inc., "' the Third Circuit staked out a field preemption position that
went well beyond what the defendant drug manufacturer had
requested (and was unnecessary to resolve the case). In holding that
a claim of false advertising, based upon an alleged unsupported
comparison to another brand name drug, was preempted,1 2 the court
reasoned:
Implied conflict preemption of state consumer fraud laws is
required... because both the FDCA and FDA regulations
provide specific requirements for prescription drug
advertising.... The high level of specificity in federal law
and regulations with respect to prescription drug advertising
is irreconcilable with general state laws that purport to
govern all types of advertising. 3
Note the affinity with the government's foundational premise in
its In re Paxil briefing that the advertising regulations comprise a
"comprehensive national regulatory scheme."'0 4
This view,
moreover, has been echoed by some commentators." 5
But the field preemption position is wholly misguided in the
realm of drug advertising. To begin, the Supreme Court has been
emphatic that:
[t]o infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a
problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying
that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field,
its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course,
would be inconsistent with the federal-state balance

101. 499 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2007).
102. In Zeneca, the court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's claims
that the drug manufacturer engaged in false advertising of Nexium by making an unsupported
comparison to Prilosec. Id. at 242.
103. Id. at 251-52 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3) (2007)).
104. Brief of the United States of America at 8, In re Paxil Litig., No. CV 01-07937 MRP,
218 F.R.D. 242, 2001 WL 34883537 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
105. See, e.g., William Dreier, Liability for Drug Advertising, Warning, and Frauds, 58
RUTGERS L. REv. 615, 629 (2006) ("The field of consumer prescription drug advertising has been
substantially occupied by the FDA, and thus a claim of a separate state standard can be disposed
of by a finding of federal preemption.").
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embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.'06
It is also far-fetched to proclaim that the FDA administers a
"comprehensive" regulatory scheme for prescription drug
advertisements. The limited nature of the FDA's regulatory review
of advertisements is detailed above in Part II.B. This more modest
view, moreover, is shared by those within the agency. Thomas
Abrams, director of the FDA's DDMAC, says the biggest
misconception is that the DDMAC screens and approves all
promotional items before they are released to the public.1"7 While the
FDA does provide comment on certain materials, most
advertisements are launched without the agency reviewing them
first. 1°8
B. Conflict Preemption

Even where broader arguments for clearing the fieldforeclosing state law causes of action simply because they arise in an
area that is the domain of comprehensive federal regulatory lawfail, narrower claims for conflict preemption may hold forth.
Implied conflict preemption remains controversial; indeed, the very
definition elicits sharply divided opinion." 9
In its narrowest
incarnation, an implied conflict arises when it would be "impossible"
for a manufacturer (or other defendant) to abide by both the federal
and state standards or regulations. ' Moving out in concentric
circles from this narrow core are "obstacle" preemption-whereby
enforcement of the state law would obstruct the federal regulatory
106. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1985).
107. Abrams elaborated as follows: "We get complaints from consumers and physicians who
call us up and say, 'Tom, how can you allow that TV ad to be on?' . . . They're flabbergasted
when we say, 'We didn't approve it before it went on TV.' Often, we're seeing it at the same
time as the American public. DDMAC has limited resources and we use our limited resources as
effectively as we can to do our job." Grant Winter, Inside DDMAC: A Conversation with
Thomas
Abrams,
Dec.
1,
2005,
http://pharmexec.fmdpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articeDetail.jsp?id=256550&pagelD= 1.
108. Id.; see also Robert A. Bell et al., Direct-to-Consumer PrescriptionDrug Advertising
and the Public, 14 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 651, 654 (1999) (finding that 50 percent of the public
believed that the FDA required prior approval of all prescription drug advertisements).
109. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767
(1994); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms,83 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2004).
110. See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000)
(describing one prong of the implied conflict preemption inquiry as looking at the entire statutory
and regulatory framework to determine whether state laws "make it 'impossible' for private
parties to comply with both state and federal law").
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scheme-and the even more protean concept where the state law
would "frustrate" the purposes of the federal regime. 1'
Once again, a close comparison with implied conflict arguments
in the drug labeling context is warranted. First, there is a basic
conceptual distinction between the realms of failure-to-warn claims
relating to drug labeling and consumer fraud claims relating to drug
advertising. The rationale for a failure-to-warn claim is ensuring
safety. Typically, in order to prevail on such a claim, one must prove
that a product "is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced by the provision of reasonable instructions
or warnings by the seller ... and the omission of the instruction or
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe."" 2 The FDA's
charge under the FDCA to determine whether prescription drugs are
safe and efficacious overlaps (at least to a significant degree) with
the rationale for failure-to-warn claims. Whereas the main purpose
of drug labels is to ensure safety, drug advertising, by contrast, is
aimed at promotion of the drug and increasing its market size." 3
While the FDA is charged with protecting against false and
misleading advertisements, its purview is more limited than that of
consumer fraud claims.
With this background distinction in mind, we can turn to a more
concrete implied preemption analysis. In prior work, I have
proposed disaggregating the FDA's "regulatory action" sphere from
its "interpretive" sphere."' Applying this framework, we can
profitably contrast the FDA's action and interpretation in the context
of drug advertising from that in the drug labeling realm.

111. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (inquiring whether state laws
"stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress"). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has resisted forging a "legal wedge-[as opposed
to] only a terminological one-between 'conflicts' that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of
a federal objective and 'conflicts' that make it 'impossible' for private parties to comply with
both state and federal law." Geier, 529 U.S. at 873.
112. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 16.12.2 at 418 (1999).
113. Research shows a direct correlation between drug companies' expenditures on
advertising and increased sales. See, e.g., GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 14 ("Studies
have found that, for many drugs, DTC advertising increases sales of the drug itself, though the

amount varies substantially.").
114. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 478; Sharkey, "at Riegel
Portends, supra note 6, at 419-23.

Summer 2008]

DRUG ADVERTISING CLAIMS

1647

1. Regulatory Action
Notwithstanding the rigor of the FDA's process for premarket
approval of drugs and accompanying labeling," 5 preemption of
failure-to-warn claims remains controversial. The courts are roughly
evenly split on the question, and await guidance from the United
States Supreme Court.'1 6 My own position-which I have elaborated
upon elsewhere-is that the FDA's initial approval of a drug's
labeling should not bestow a blanket immunity upon the
manufacturer for any and all failure-to-warn claims stemming from
risks associated with the approved drug." 7 Instead, a narrower class
of claims should be preempted. This class should be comprised of
those claims arising from the precise risks that were weighed by the
FDA, either at the time of initial approval, or more typically in the
case where a new risk has come to light after initial approval, and
upon the FDA's considered inquiry into a weighing of the new
attendant risks. Such claims, in essence, call for courts (and juries)
to conduct a "redo" of a determination already made by the FDA.
This framework could profitably be applied in the context of FDA
review of advertising.
There is, however, a salient difference between the failure-towarn claims and drug advertisements, given the generally more lax
system of regulatory review pertaining to advertisements. In terms
of regulatory action with respect to drug labeling, the FDA
necessarily must make a definitive determination-at the very least,
at the time the drug is approved-that the information on the drug
label comports with safety and effectiveness." 8 By contrast, the
FDA may choose not to take any action whatsoever with respect to a
print advertisement submitted for the agency's review." 9
Advertisements, unlike drug labels, can run before any review is
115. For a detailed description of the FDA drug approval process, see Lars Noah, Premarket
Approval and Postmarket Surveillance, Pharmaceutical Products, in LAW, MEDICINE, AND
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS 221-54 (2d ed. 2007).
116. See Wyeth v. Levine, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (No. 06-1249) (argued Nov. 3, 2008) (considering
"[w]hether the prescription drug labeling judgments imposed on manufacturers by the [FDA].
pursuant to FDA's comprehensive safety and efficacy authority under the [FDCA] preempt state
law product liability claims premised on the theory that different labeling judgments were
necessary
to
make
drugs
reasonably
safe
for
use"),
available
at
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/06-01249qp.pdf(link).
117. Sharkey, ProductsLiability Preemption, supra note 6, at 513-14.
118. See21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(2006).
119. See supra Part 1I.B.
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conducted; whereas drug labels are put through the rigorous
premarket approval process. The bottom line is that in sharp contrast
to the premarket approval process for drugs and labeling, which
culminates in a finding that the drug is "safe for use under the
conditions

. . .

suggested in the proposed labeling,"' 2 the DDMAC

does not acknowledge or even track advertisements that do not result
2
in regulatory letters.'

For this reason, even in a case where failure-to-warn claims
present a strong case for preemption, consumer fraud claims
stemming from advertising may pale in comparison. In this regard,
the analysis of the California federal district court in In re Bextra and
Celebrex Marketing Sales Practicesand ProductLiability Litigation
is spot on. 22 The court preempted the labeling claims, while refusing
to preempt advertising claims. 23 The drug manufacturer (Pfizer) had
submitted its challenged advertisements to the DDMAC; and, on the
whole, the DDMAC did not object to them. 24 On this basis, Pfizer
argued that the FDA "'necessarily determined' that the unobjectedto advertisements are accurate and strike a fair balance between the
benefits and risks of Celebrex; therefore, "any claim that such
advertisements were deceptive conflicts with the FDA's
25
determination to the contrary and are impliedly preempted."
The court, however, rightly resisted reading the FDA's silence
in this context as a determinative regulatory action. 26 The court was
emphatic that "there is nothing in the record from which the Court
could conclude that the FDA has actually reviewed all of the
submitted advertisements, let alone conclude that the FDA's review

120. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
121. See GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 ("[B]ecause FDA does not track
information on its reviews, the agency cannot determine whether a particular material has been
reviewed."); id. at 26 ("[B]ecause FDA does not document decisions made at the various stages
of its review process about whether to pursue a violation, officials were unable to provide us with
an estimate of the number of materials about which concerns were raised but the agency did not
issue a letter.").
122. No. M:05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006).
123. Id. at*].
124. Id. at*1l.
125. Id.
126. Id. ("Pfizer cites no authority for its assertion that the FDA's silence as to a particular
advertisement means that the FDA 'necessarily determined' that the advertisement was not
deceptive ....
").
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means that it has definitively determined that the advertisement was
not misleading. "127
Therefore, the FDA's silence in the face of submitted
advertisements cannot be read as a definitive regulatory action
sufficient to preempt state law claims. There is no basis, in other
words, for an argument that the state law claims would conflict with
28
the federal regulatory scheme. 1

It is a closer call where the record demonstrates that the FDA
made some definitive determination. There may be a class of cases
in which the consumer fraud claim attempts a redo of the FDA's
regulatory review, and preemption might appropriately succeed in
those circumstances. In that case, however, the court must scrutinize
the precise regulatory determination by the FDA and then proceed to
solicit the agency's interpretation of its regulatory process.
2. Interpretive Sphere
Reliance upon federal agencies in the interpretive sphere (as
distinct from on the basis of their regulatory actions) is a largely
uncharted area in terms of preemption doctrine. In deciding products
liability preemption issues, the Supreme Court has been influenced
by agency positions, but has not always been upfront about the
degree to which the agency's view is dispositive 1 29 Reliance upon
federal agency interpretation at successive levels-issuance of
regulations regarding preemptive scope, contemporaneous views
interpreting regulatory action, and expressions of views in amicus
briefs before courts-is contentious (and increasingly so, with the
FDA's move away from official regulations toward less formal
interpretive positions). 3 '
Beginning in the early 2000s, the FDA has taken a fairly
aggressive stance on preemption in the context of failure-to-warn

127. Id.
128. Consider in this regard the dissent's position in Zeneca. See Pennsylvania. Employees
Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 258 (3d Cir. 2007) (Cowen, J., dissenting)
("Given that there are limitations to the FDA's oversight over prescription drug advertisementsboth congressionally-imposed limitations, such as the lack of authority to require preapproval,
and practical limitations attendant to the sheer volume of drug advertisements in the media-the
supplementation of state-law remedies would seem to aid the FDCA's objectives and purposes,
not frustrate them.") (citations omitted).
129. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 471-72.
130. Id. at 479.
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claims, by strategically intervening as amicus in cases in order to
persuade courts to rule in favor of preemption."' In 2006, in order to
consolidate and formalize its position, the FDA issued a preamble to
a rule that specified the format and content of prescription drug

labels. 32 In that preamble, the FDA made a controversial assertion
that FDA approval of drugs should lead to preemption of some state

law claims.'33 The preamble's focus is, by and large, on failure-towarn claims. It alludes to advertising in passing and only when
either omissions or inclusions in advertisements would be used to
support a warnings claim.'34 For example, the preamble calls for
preemption of a state law claim
that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by
failing to include a statement in labeling or in advertising,

the substance of which had been proposed to FDA for
inclusion in labeling, if that statement was not required by
the FDA at the time plaintiff claims the sponsor had an

obligation to warn. "'
In a similar vein, the FDA takes the position that print
advertisements in compliance with draft guidelines for the DTCA
should foreclose suits based upon allegations that the advertisement
itself does not contain a warning arguably required by state law, so
long as a suitable warning is contained in the brief summary.'3 6

131. Id. at 504-05.

132. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006); see also Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble, supra note 6.

133. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
134. Each of the FDA's examples that reference advertisements refer to failure to warn claims
that should be preempted: (i) a plaintiff claims failure to warn because a label or advertisement
lacks a statement, but the statement is prohibited by FDA's labeling rules; (ii) a plaintiff claims
failure to warn because a label or advertisement lacks a statement of contraindications or
warnings which is not supported by the evidence according to standards of the labeling rule; (iii)
a plaintiff claims failure to warn because a label or advertisement lacks a statement, but when the
drug company proposed the statement to the FDA for inclusion, the FDA did not require it; (iv) a
plaintiff claims failure to warn because an advertisement lacks information that appears in the
drug label, but the drug sponsor has followed the FDA's draft guidance regarding direct-toconsumer print advertisements. Id. at 3936 (examples 5, 3, 4, 2). Example 6 further asserts
preemption of claims alleging that drug sponsors "breached an obligation to plaintiff by making
statements" the FDA has approved for use on product labeling. Id.
135. Id. at 3934.
136. Id. at 3936; see also FDA, Brief Summary: Disclosing Risk Information in ConsumerDirected Print Advertisements (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/

5669dfl.pdf.
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In recent drug advertising cases raising consumer fraud
allegations, the FDA has remained curiously silent. Courts thus far
have read the silence as attesting to the FDA's lack of commitment
to preempt consumer fraud claims: "The FDA has been silent with
respect to the preemption of lawsuits challenging false claims in
prescription drug advertisements. This silence suggests that the FDA
does not intend its review of promotional materials to preempt false
'
The FDA's silence, though, is only one piece
advertising claims." 137

of the evidence of lack of conflict between state law consumer fraud
claims and the federal scheme regulating drug advertising.
CONCLUSION

As preemption's frontier pushes out beyond state law products
liability claims alleging dangerous and defective FDA-approved
medical devices and drugs into the realm of consumer fraud claims
based upon false or misleading drug advertisements, it is worth
pausing to ask whether this move is an inevitable, logical extension.
Does it further underlying rationales privileging the FDA's domain
over the common law or does it represent a progression with surface
appeal only, which cannot withstand probing scrutiny?
The crux of the preemption debate centers on whether the
decision-maker adjudges the FDA's regulation a floor (or minimal)
or ceiling (or optimal) standard-the former permitting
complementary state actions; the latter foreclosing them as
meddlesome substitutes. The FDA's advertisement review process
appears to provide a (rather weak) floor rather than an optimal
regulatory standard. On the whole, the FDA does not appear to be
engaged in an exercise of optimization, weighing the costs and
benefits of the DTCA. For this reason, it would be rare for pursuit of
the state law tort action to be characterized as a "redo" of what the
FDA has already determined. And thus, consumer fraud claims
arising from drug advertisements should withstand preemption
challenges.

137. In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M: 05-1699
CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006). The court concluded that "[w]hile
this silence is not dispositive of conflict preemption, it is additional evidence of no actual
conflict." Id.
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